Injustice and the Disappearance of Discretionary
Detention under Trump:
Detaining Low Risk Immigrants without Bond
Robert Koulishc, 1 and Katherine Evansd, 1
a

iLCSS; b GVPT-University of Maryland; c MLAW-University of Maryland; d Duke University Law School

May 22, 2020

those who, like Julian, pose no real threat to public security,
nor risk of flight.
The no-release, no-bond policy was created in two steps.
In February 2015, Obama attached a no-bond policy to the
risk tool. It stopped recommending individuals be given the
opportunity for release on bond. In June 2017, Trump added
a no-release component to the risk tool removing the risk
tool’s ability to recommend release for even the lowest risk
immigrants. When combined with the Obama policy, under
Trump, the risk assessment tool could only make one substantive recommendation: detention without bond. The current
system detains, as a matter of policy, individuals that a neutral
magistrate would likely order released from custody with few
conditions. The logic behind individualized determinations
fell apart as individuals who should be singled out for release
were instead detained without bond.
The immigration statute and regulations for discretionary
detention require that ICE make an individualized custody
determination. Detained immigrants under this scheme can
then challenge ICE’s custody decision before an immigration
judge, but that process can take weeks, if not months; meanwhile they languish in jail.2 Scholars have shown individuals
languishing in prolonged detention can be forced to suffer physical and psychological trauma (Ryo, 2016). These harms are
further exacerbated by the covid-19 pandemic, which exposes
immigrants in civil detention to life threatening illness without
access to testing, masks, or even soap.3
Trump seems bent on imposing needless trauma upon as
many immigrants as possible. Almost everybody is detained

This Report demonstrates that the Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) violates legal requirements to provide immigrants
with an individualized custody determination. Trump’s enforcement
policies brought a surge of low-risk immigrants into ICE custody.
The detention risk tool was supposed to train officers and strongly
discourage them from detaining low-risk immigrants who posed no
harm to society and were not a flight risk. Data received pursuant
to FOIA show the opposite result. ICE has failed to perform the individualized assessment and restrict its use of civil detention to only
those whose high levels of dangerousness and risk of flight justify
their incarceration. The data show that officers have manipulated
the risk tool by subjecting low-risk immigrants to blanket detention,
which has come to define the no-release Trump immigration policy
in the New York City area.

Introduction1
Since 2013, immigrants in ICE custody have been assessed by
a risk classification assessment (RCA) algorithm to determine
whether they will be detained, subject to release on bond or
released on community supervision. Since its implementation, the Department of Homeland Security (DHS)’s RCA has
become the federal government’s largest risk tool and accompanies the world’s largest immigration detention operation.
The system was originally intended to pair detention with risk
and to detain only individuals who posed a risk severe enough
to warrant physical incarceration as opposed to release.
This report is a qualitative and quantitative analysis of
ICE detention in the New York City Area of Operation (AOR)
from 2013-2019, using 33,413 cases received from a Freedom
of Information request to ICE. The New York City Area of
Operation includes the five boroughs of New York City, plus
Duchess, Nassau, Putnam, Suffolk, Sullivan, Orange, Rockland, Ulster, and Westchester counties. Decisions regarding
the custody of immigrants in this geographic region are made
by ICE’s New York City Field Office. Specifically, the report
analyzes the ICE New York City Field Office’s practice of
using the risk tool to detain low-risk immigrants, who are eligible for release under statute and regulations, without bond.
Using data provided by ICE, we demonstrate that ICE fails to
make individualized custody determinations for those low-risk
immigrants eligible for release. The no-release detention policy
instead mandates the detention of individuals for whom bond
and other conditions of release are available. Consequently,
ICE has detained almost every noncitizen in custody, including
1
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This research examines significant changes in Trump’s immigration detention release policy starting after his inauguration
in January 2017. We provide evidence that changes in release
started with immigration officers dissenting from the algorithmic
risk recommendation in February 2017 which led to a shift in
the algorithm in June 2017, which formalized the no-release
policy under Trump. The analysis draws data from immigration
detention cases between 2013 and 2019 received pursuant to
the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA).
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without bond in the custody of the DHS, with outliers that
are subject to release on excessively high bond.
The data in this report were obtained from ICE by the New
York Civil Liberties Union (NYCLU) pursuant to a Freedom
of Information Act (FOIA) request, and have been analyzed by
Professor Robert Koulish, Joel J. Feller Research Professor at
the University of Maryland, and founding director of MLAW
Programs; Kate Evans, Clinical Professor of Law and director
of the Immigrant Rights Clinic at Duke University School of
Law; and Ernesto Calvo, professor of government and politics
at the University of Maryland. It is part of a larger project
conducted by Koulish, et al. on risk and immigration detention.
Additional information released by DHS included the RCA’s
original risk assessment algorithms, changes to its scoring
rubrics, training materials and data for thousands of risk
cases nationally.4 These materials are available online and are
analyzed by Evans and Koulish (Evans and Koulish, 2020) in
a separate publication.

The Legal Framework for Immigration Detention
In 1996, Congress enacted a series of changes to immigration
laws that made it more difficult for immigrants with any criminal history to remain in the United States. At the same time,
Congress expanded the grounds of mandatory immigration detention. The mandatory detention provision in section 236(c)
of the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) increased the
category of no-bond detention for persons convicted of specific
enumerated offenses to include minor misdemeanor offenses
alongside serious violent crimes. The justification for mandatory detention was to incapacitate dangerous individuals who
posed the greatest flight risk without bond to ensure their
removal from the country.5
Detention of other immigrants awaiting a decision on their
removal is governed by section 236(a) of the INA. Section
236(a) allows for discretionary detention and provides ICE
with three options: 1) to continue to detain the arrested alien
“pending the removal proceedings”; 2) to “release the alien” on
“bond of at least $1,500”; or 3) to release the alien on “conditional parole.” The regulations implementing INA § 236(a)
require a case-by-case determination based on whether the individual poses a risk to public safety or to flight.6 Categorical
detention is thus not permitted by statute or regulation for
this group of immigrants.
Because certain people are mandatorily detained based on
their removal charges, the timing of their apprehension, or the
presence of a final removal order in their cases, regardless of
risk,7 the RCA is most useful in assessing risk for noncitizens
who are discretionarily detained under INA § 236(a). Consequently, the majority of this study is limited to individuals
who are not identified in the data as subject to mandatory
detention, i.e. they do not have final removal orders and do
not have criminal offense that fall within 236(c). This report
shows that as much as mandatory detention contributes to
mass detention of mostly Latinx immigrants (Ryo and Peacock,
2018), the second classification of detention, INA § 236(a), has
4
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been turned into an accomplice to ICE’s efforts to widen the
net of immigrants forced to endure prolonged detention.

Processing Immigrants into Custody
Decisions about detention are made as part of the custody
determination process following initial intake as follows:
• The immigrant is arrested and brought into ICE custody.
• ICE makes an initial custody determination within 48
hours.
• As part of the initial intake process, ICE enters all information into the risk classification assessment to generate a
detain/release recommendation as well as a bond amount
(until bond was eliminated from the algorithm).
• The ICE officer, and then supervisor, agree/disagree with
the risk tool’s recommendation.
While individuals may be arrested by ICE, they may also
enter ICE custody through an external office such as Customs
and Border Patrol (CBP), Homeland Security Investigations
(HSI), Criminal Alien Program (CAP) officers in state and
federal prisons, or state and local officers designated to enforce immigration law through the 287(g) program. ICE must
decide whether to place an individual in removal proceedings within 48 hours unless there is an emergency or other
extraordinary circumstance.8 The RCA is applied either by
the external arresting agency or at the point of transfer to
ICE custody. Data gathered through intake is combined with
the migrant’s responses to structured interview questions to
determine public safety and flight risk levels and to generate a
custody recommendation. Data from the risk tool informs us
whether ICE has engaged in an individualized determination
or blanket detention based on whether detention correlates
with risk.

The Risk Classification Assessment (RCA)
In January 2013, DHS launched the RCA—the largest risk
assessment tool in the country—as part of its expanding detention regime (Nofferi and Koulish, 2014). The RCA would, in
theory, measure a migrant’s flight risk and risk to public safety
in order to determine whether he or she should be detained
by ICE.9
The RCA is an automated risk tool designed to help determine whether to detain or release non-citizens pending their
deportation proceedings. Modeled on evidence-based criminal
justice reforms (Lowenkamp et al., 2013; VanNostrand and
Keebler, 2009), the RCA combines database records and interview information into a weighted scoring system that produces
security and flight assessments—low, medium, high—and issues custody and supervision recommendations. The RCA was
originally programmed to generate one of four recommendations: (1) detain in the custody of DHS (no bond); (2) detain,
but as eligible for bond, with an accompanying recommended
bond amount; (3) supervisor to determine; (4) release.
The ICE officer and supervisor respond to the recommendation. The officer must specify if he or she agrees with the RCA
8
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recommendation and provide reasons for any disagreement.
Then an ICE supervisor must review the RCA recommendation along with the ICE officer’s comments and make a
final decision with respect to the person’s custody and any
conditions for detention or release.
The RCA has four sections. The first section requires the
ICE officer to identify any “special vulnerability” the migrant
has through an interview and observations. The special vulnerabilities section is a response to mounting reports of men
and women dying or suffering severe harm in immigration
custody. The RCA contains a discrete list of vulnerabilities,
which include: “serious physical injury, serious mental illness,
disability, elderly, pregnant, nursing, sole caretaking responsibility, risk based on sexual orientation/gender identity, victim
of persecution/torture, victim of sexual abuse or violent crime,
victim of human trafficking.” As it turns out the data we
present below shows that very few immigrants are identified
with special vulnerabilities, despite the broad characteristics,
e.g., sole caretaker or trauma survivor, the tool is supposed to
flag.

derived from the various ICE databases, including immigration history and the FBI’s National Crime Information Center
(NCIC) database, which aggregates criminal history across
jurisdictions. If the person has a final order of removal, he
will be identified as subject to mandatory detention, with a
few exceptions. Likewise, if the person was not authorized
to enter the U.S. and was arrested within 14 days of entry
near the border, he or she will be mandatorily detained. ICE
officers must also review the criminal history and ensure that
the removal charges are correct. The removal charges are then
evaluated through the RCA to see if they trigger mandatory
detention under INA § 236(c) and, if they do, the RCA recommends that the immigrant be detained without bond. A
glimpse at the empirical data we present below in Chart 2
shows the mandatory detention category was responsible for
detaining about a third (35%) of the immigrants in the New
York field office during the time of this study. Because individuals who meet any of the mandatory detention criteria are
detained regardless of risk, the remainder of this report focuses
on individuals who are eligible for bond but are nonetheless
detained.

Chart 1: Percent of Total Cases Identified as Having a Special Vulnerability, 2013-2019
Chart 2: Percent of Total Immigrants Detained Subject to Mandatory Detention, 20132019.
N=33,412

Most of the immigrants with special vulnerabilities are
still detained without bond, by ICE. As seen in Figure 1 by
2019 about 85% of immigrants with special vulnerabilities
(including both mandatory and non-mandatory detention) are
detained without bond. In the section marked “findings”, we
break down the custody outcomes and risk classifications for
individuals in non-mandatory detention.

Third is the section that requires an evaluation of public
safety, and fourth is the section that evaluates flight risk. These
factors generate a score that correlates to a high/medium/low
public safety risk level and high/medium/low flight risk level.
The risk levels are then combined to provide the risk tool’s
ultimate custody recommendation. Public safety factors document a migrant’s criminal history, including the severity and
number of crimes along with recentness of the offense. The
goal was to align the scoring methodology to criminological
classifications of dangerousness. Much of the information is
drawn automatically from the FBI NCIC database. Risk factors are scored, and the RCA then assigns a risk level based
on the public safety score. The RCA, however, disproportionately weighs certain charges so that some low-severity offenses,
regardless of conviction, make release nearly impossible.10
Flight factors originally covered more dynamic information
about the migrant’s family and community relationships in
this country. Information relevant to flight risk is generated for
the most part during ICE intake interviews with the migrant.
Scoring factors included family stability, property ownership,
military service, work authorization, legal representation, and
a stable address. The key flight factors initially emphasized
length of residence and community ties. These factors were

Fig. 1. Share of Decisions for Immigrants in Custody with Special Vulnerabilities,
2013-2019

The second section of the RCA requires an evaluation of
mandatory detention. The inputs for mandatory detention are
et al.
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manipulated over time, though, to neutralize community ties
and instead tie flight risk to date of entry, date of removal
order, or visa overstay.11
The RCA originally was programed to recommend release
for people designated as a low risk for both flight and danger.
Immigrants in the “low risk” category generally do not have
criminal histories, but could have convictions for immigration
offenses like illegal entry, or low-severity crimes like traffic violations (though having both within the last five years garnered
a medium risk classification to public safety). Immigrants
categorized as medium risks may have prior immigration violations or lack family ties, or they may have a low-level criminal
offense on their record, including drug possession, prostitution,
or shoplifting, plus a single traffic offense. Throughout the
duration of the RCA, the risk tool has deferred a significant
number of medium risk combinations to a supervisor for a final
decision. By 2015, however, individuals with medium risk assessments in both public safety and flight were recommended
for detention without bond. The RCA recommended that
individuals classified as high-risk for both flight and danger
be detained with bond initially, and then eliminated the bond
recommendation. These individuals may be categorized as a
high risk of danger because of their criminal history score or
as a high risk of flight simply because of their recent arrival.
Scholars and immigrant advocates hoped that the RCA
would serve as a check on mass immigration detention and
push ICE to popularize alternatives to detention.12
In the early pre-launch days of the RCA, the Lutheran
Immigration and Refugee Service (LIRS) had argued for the
least restrictive means of custodial supervision for immigrants
(imm, 2011).
Noferi and Koulish have documented the bipartisan support
for alternatives to detention (ATD), along with substantial
cost saving.13 Amaral (Amaral, 2013) has documented the
psychological benefits to the immigrant of using ATD rather
than physical detention. Still, as Koulish and Calvo (Koulish
and Calvo, 2020) show, the human alternatives to detention
effectively tend to be overrun by punitive bias in the decision
making process.
Scholars have also documented the impact that prolonged
detention has on immigrants, particularly low-risk detainees.
First, many low-risk refugees are traumatized before entering
the U.S. immigration system (Keller et al., 2017). Second,
studies have shown that individuals who do not pose harm
are themselves traumatized by detention or incarceration. In
particular, time spent in detention can cause psychological
decline and trauma (Peterie, 2018). Unfortunately, the data
described below show that the RCA did not result in a reduc11

tion in detention and has thus failed to prevent the severe and
pervasive harm civil immigration detention inflicts.

Manipulating the RCA
The RCA was designed to be highly malleable, responsive to
changing enforcement and detention priorities,14 and other
factors. The risk system has been manipulated in four ways
since 2012 by changing the scores assigned to each factor; the
severity of every criminal offense; the scoring thresholds associated with high, medium, or low risk levels; and the ultimate
recommendation generated for various combinations of flight
and public safety risk levels. Manipulation of any one of these
variables has the power to increase or decrease the likelihood
of detention for thousands of migrants. These changes are
represented by two themes: 1) accommodating enforcement
priorities and, 2) accommodating officer preferences.
In addition, the changes can be divided into four separate
time periods. The first version was in effect from October 2012
to December 2013.15 This period covers from the beginning of
the pilot period for the risk tool through the national launch in
late January 2013. The algorithm translated Obama enforcement priorities, known as the “Morton memos” issued in 2011,
16
into factors to be weighted for the purpose of recommending
detention and release. The second scoring system spanned December 2013 to January 2015. These changes accommodated
internal disagreements between the RCA recommendation and
final supervisor decisions. These significant changes to the risk
algorithm are explained elsewhere by Koulish and Calvo (2020)
and Evans and Koulish (2020). The third major shift again
accommodated changing enforcement priorities announced in
November 2014 with the label “felons, not families”, and appeared in version 6.3 of the risk tool during February 2015.
Finally, the fourth time period starts with version 6.4 in June
2017. This shift in the algorithm represents Trump’s no-release
detention policy. Evans and Koulish (2020) explain the manipulation of the risk algorithm and its departure from accepted
indicia of risk in a separate article.17

The Shifting Policy to Eliminate Bond under the Obama
Administration
President Obama entered office with ideas for reforming immigration detention. The new Administration commissioned
a national study of the conditions of detention centers nationwide, instigated by a series of highly publicized detention abuses. The Schriro Report (Schriro, 2009) documented
management flaws, lack of oversight, medical attention, and
pervasive abuse, and included risk classification assessment
among its recommendations. The risk tool was piloted July
2012, and was deployed nationally by the end of January 2013.
Since 2011, the risk tool accommodated ICE enforcement
priorities, starting with the Morton Memo in 2011, and in
November 2014, Obama proposed the “Felons, Not Families”
priorities. President Obama’s November 2014 announcement
of a new priority enforcement policy prompted major revisions

Id.
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Refugees expressed concern that the tool ‘risks becoming a bureaucratic, tick-box exercise and
may lead only to artificial individual assessments rather than real ones’ and that its methodology
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standards — while empirically demonstrating the lack of additional risk.”); 201 (2012) (recommend15
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Office Dirs.
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to the RCA’s factors and scoring methodology in February
2015 to align the RCA with the new prosecutorial priorities.18
Each significant change in enforcement translated into a new
risk algorithm that was increasingly stringent for immigrants.
As a result of algorithmic changes in February 2015, the RCA
no longer used classic indicia of flight risk. Instead, date of
entry was the prime determinant of flight risk level, earning a
detention-no bond recommendation for recent entrants.
Public safety risk changed so that the scoring of certain
crimes like drug possession, previously categorized as low
severity, would now generate a medium public safety risk assessment followed by a recommendation for no-bond detention.
Moreover, during the final year and a half of the Obama Administration, the RCA recommendations based on combined
public safety and flight risk scores no longer generated a bond
recommendation for anyone and only the low/low risk combination resulted in the recommendation for release. The result
was a dramatic increase in individuals who were statutorily
eligible for release but nonetheless detained without bond by
ICE.
The changes under Obama became increasingly punitive
with low-severity offenses pushed into higher risk categories
and reductions in the scoring thresholds tied to low and
medium risk levels. The risk tool’s detention recommendations thus increasingly reflected political enforcement priorities,
rather than indicia of flight risk or risk to public safety to
justify civil detention.

The No-Release Policy under the Trump Administration
Under Trump, even low-risk individuals are trapped in detention without bond. About three weeks after Trump issued
Executive Order 13768 in January 2017, then-DHS Secretary
John Kelly issued two enforcement memoranda that instructed
enforcement officers to treat all immigration violations alike,
regardless of criminal history or risk level. As a result, ICE
enforcement priorities ceased as low-risk immigrants were arrested indistinguishably along with medium and high-risk
individuals. This policy can be traced to Trump’s antipathy towards immigrants well documented elsewhere. By late
spring 2017, Kelly’s enforcement memo was translated for
risk purposes as the RCA algorithm was modified to ensure
low-risk individuals were as likely as high-risk individuals to
be detained without bond.
While the Obama Administration eliminated bond eligibility from the recommendations given by the RCA for anyone
with a medium or high-risk level in either category, the Trump
Administration went further. In 2017, Reuters News reported
that DHS eliminated the release recommendation altogether
(Rosenberg and Levinson, 2018). With this additional manipulation, a person seeking to leave immigration detention,
regardless of their low risk of flight and low risk to public
safety, had to rely on a supervisor’s final decision or wait
weeks to challenge their detention in immigration court. Not
surprisingly, the rate of detention of individuals with no criminal history tripled after the Trump Administration struck the
18

release recommendation.19

Training the Risk Algorithm
While enforcement priorities were one of several factors responsible for changing the algorithm, as important was the
rate at which ICE supervisors disagreed with the algorithm’s
custody recommendations. Such disagreements came in the
form of the override rate, which measured the frequency at
which supervisors’ final decisions diverged from the RCA’s
recommendation. ICE has stated that it assesses the efficacy
of its risk tool by evaluating the extent that ICE officers override the tool’s detain/release recommendation. Since override
rates became the stock and trade of internal evaluations of
the tool’s effectiveness, the corresponding incentive for the
RCA’s designers was to create an algorithm that appeased
the preferences of ICE supervisors. The idea that detention
ought to accommodate risk levels thus evaporated, as the risk
algorithm instead accommodates officer preference. The RCA
became an example of the tail wagging the dog with the loss
of liberty for thousands of people as a result.
A separate study by Koulish and Calvo (2020) shows that
ICE officers have punitive bias, which is shown in patterns
of dissent (overrides). Overrides of low risk recommendations
were more prevalent than of high-risk recommendations, causing ICE to narrow the scope of the low risk categories, pushing
people with the same histories from low risk categories to
medium and high-risk categories. The RCA is changed to lower
overrides by making the same history result in medium/high
risk levels AND by changing the outcomes to recommend detention without bond for more risk categories. This occurred
by making changes at each level of the algorithm, including
the scores assigned to various factors; the severity levels for
certain criminal offenses; the range of scores designating high,
medium, or low risk levels; and the ultimate recommendation
generated for various combinations of flight and public safety
risk levels.20 Under Obama, training the algorithm resulted
in fewer immigrants assessed as low public safety and flight
risk. However, the tool retained a release recommendation for
those who were assessed as low risk in both categories. Under
Trump, high numbers of low-risk individuals were ushered
into custody by combining a policy of widening the net of
immigrants apprehended with the elimination of the release
recommendation for those with the lowest risks. As a result,
we see higher rates of individuals with low level or no criminal
records in immigration detention under Trump.

FINDINGS
Obama’s No Bond Policy. Bond eligibility plays a crucial role

for immigrants who find themselves detained under INA §
236(a) by limiting the duration of detention and allowing
immigrants to ascertain counsel and pursue relief from removal
(Ryo, 2016; Gilman, 2016) The report, from this point forward,
focuses on the custody decisions for those immigrants Congress
has designated as eligible for release with or without conditions,
such as bond.
In February 2015 the RCA was modified to remove its ability to recommend bond. Unbeknownst to the general public,

E-mail from Enforcement & Removal Operations on behalf of Marc Rapp, Assistant Dir., Law Enforcement Systems & Analysis, regarding changes to the RCA Scoring Methodology, to Field Office
Directors, Deputy Field Office Directors and Assistant Field Office Directors (Feb. 11, 2015, 1:03
PM), in C ONSOLIDATED R ESPONSES, 2016-ICLI-00018, 15–16 (July 2017) (obtained by the authors
19
Id.
through a Freedom of Information Act request and available on the Evans and Koulish repository,
20
supra note 5).
See Evans & Koulish, supra note 5.
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this modification was a creature of the Obama Administration, following at the heels of Obama’s most pro-immigrant
administrative reform, Deferred Action for Parents of Americans (DAPA), the expansion of Deferred Action for Childhood
Arrivals (DACA) and the announcement of new enforcement
priorities to focus on “felons, not families.” It is significant
that a focus on detaining and deporting recent arrivals, many
of whom were women and children seeking asylum, accompanied these enforcement reforms. In brief, the algorithm
version 6.0 that followed these policy announcements, effective
February 2015, significantly changed detention and release
criteria. In exchange for dropping enforcement against people
with long-standing ties to the U.S. and parents of U.S. citizens
and permanent residents, DHS under Obama jerry-rigged the
risk tool to deny release to any unauthorized immigrant who
entered the country after January 1, 2014. It was at this
moment that the RCA stopped being useful to measure risk.
It had been completely subsumed by Obama’s enforcement
priorities, as humane as the public was led to believe they
were.
Obama’s No-Bond Policy Meets Trump’s No-Release Policy.

Consequently, Table 1 and Chart 3 (below) show final decisions by “Detain Without Bond”; Detain With Bond”; and
“Release”, by year from 2013-2019 (N=20,433). We show
the constant rate of detention overall along with significant
changes in the detention with bond decision starting February
2015 and no release starting June 2017. Both Obama and
Trump dramatically shifted the RCA algorithm to coincide
with policy considerations.
Table 1 is significant for two reasons: it demonstrates the
overwhelming majority of detained-no bond cases since 2013,
followed by the disappearance of bond after 2015 (February
2015) and release in 2017 (June 2017). No cases were recommended for bond after February 2015. This included both
RCA recommendations and final decisions by supervisors. The
shift in the rate of cases with detain without bond recommendations versus cases with detain with a bond recommendations
demonstrates a shift in policy intended to minimize release of
individuals eligible for release under statute by requiring all
migrants to seek review of the no-bond decisions in front of
an immigration judge.
Looking at these final decisions, the shift is particularly
noticeable from 2014, during which 60% (2,336 of 3,920) of
individuals were detained without bond, to 2015, when this
percentage jumped significantly to 92% (1,765 of 2,316). This
change coincided with the Obama Administration’s decision to
eliminate bond from any detention recommendation generated
by the RCA. The rate of detention without bond then inched
up to 94% in 2016 (1,447 of 1,532), 97% in 2017 (2,917 of
2,994), and 98% in both 2018 and 2019 (3,243 of 3,295). See
the Appendix to this report for further details.
Viewed in the reverse, the data show the near elimination
of bond from ICE’s custody decisions. In 2013, 21% (1,112
individuals) were designated for detain with bond. In 2014,
14% (559) were detained with bond. In 2015, 2.3% (45) were
designated detain with bond. In 2016, the rate dropped to 0%
with 1 person receiving a detain with bond decision. The rate
of 0% for bond eligibility decisions remained steady through
2019.
Finally, Table 1 also shows outcomes from Trump’s norelease policy in 2017. Release, with or without community
6
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Table 1. Migrants Detained By Final Decisions for Bond in the New
York City Area by Year

2013
%
2014
%
2015
%
2016
%
2017
%
2018
%
2019
%
Total
%

No Bond
4,048
78.46
3,361
85.74
1,881
97.66
1,524
99.93
2,965
99.87
3,287
99.97
1,347
99.93
18,413
91.45

Bond
1,111
21.54
559
14.26
45
2.34
1
0.07
4
0.13
1
0.03
1
0.07
1,722
8.55

Total
5,159
100
3,920
100
1,926
100
1,525
100
2,969
100
3,288
100
1,348
100
20,135
100

supervision, has been underutilized throughout the life of the
risk tool. The already depressed rate of release during early
years of the risk tool stand in stark relief to the rate of release
under Trump: from 19% (960) of individuals in 2013 and 26%
(1,025) in 2014, to 2% in 2017 and 1.54% in 2018.
ICE’s treatment of low risk immigrants demonstrates the
cruelty and unlawfulness of its detention policy. In February
2015, the algorithm is changed to eliminate bond from the
RCA’s recommendations. The table below shows the resulting
drop off in bond recommendations by ICE, with 21% granted
bond in 2013, down to .07% in 2016.
In 2017, Trump’s no-release policy compounded the deleterious effects for immigrants. During the first several months
of the Trump Administration, journalists from Reuters investigated the RCA because very few individuals were being
released. As it turns out, the risk tool had been in use since
Day 1 of the Trump administration, but was hampered by
the removal of the recommendation of release for people assessed as low flight risk and low public safety risks and we
believe replaced the “release” option with either a “Defer to
Supervisor” or “Detain with bond” option. The RCA then
reserved very high bond recommendations for individuals with
low/low risk level combinations, resulting in a skyrocketing
rate of immigrants assessed as low flight risk and low risk to
public safety held in civil detention.
Immigrants eligible to receive bond under Trump constituted cases that came through the final supervisor decision
(the risk tool allows for a supervisor to determine options for
individuals assessed with mid-level risks). As a result, the
RCA has functioned as a risk tool in name only. Zero tolerance enforcement plus zero release detention sealed the fate of
low-risk individuals who encounter ICE: almost everyone ends
up detained without bond.
By examining the category of migrants with low/low-risk
assessment levels, we show significant increases in detention
without bond beginning in 2015. In 2014, 35% of individuals
with low/low-risk assessments were detained without bond.
By February 2015, with the algorithm making it difficult to
score a low/low risk level combination—the only group who
received a release recommendation—about two-thirds (67%) of
the low/low risk group were detained without bond. Beginning
et al.

in 2017, between 80% and 100% of people assessed with low
flight risk and low risk to public safety were detained without
bond

Fig. 3. Change in Share of Low Risk Individuals Released by ICE
Fig. 2. Final Custody Decisions for Low/Low Risk Individuals by Month, 2013-2019

Drop in Release Rate for Low-Risk Immigrants. When analyz-

ing individuals who are detained without bond, it is startling
to see such a high rate of low-risk individuals, who pose no
threat to their communities or risk of flight. These are the
people that individualized custody determinations under INA
§ 236(a) are intended to serve, allowing them to continue living productively in the community as their immigration cases
journey towards completion. And yet, our analysis shows an
extremely high rate of detention without bond for low-risk
immigrants, particularly after Trump became president. As a
result, immigrants are forced to wait weeks in order to plead
their cases before an immigration judge, while experiencing the
harms associated with that delay: loss of work, no income to
support family members, mental illness, poor medical services,
and far greater difficulty in securing legal assistance.
Accompanying the loss of bond recommendations is a significant drop in low-risk immigrants being released from detention
altogether. Graph 321 below depicts the percentage of individuals with Low Public Safety/Low Flight Risk Assessments
who are released. With the RCA versions 6.4-6.6, created
under the Trump Administration, we show the steep reduction
in individuals released on community supervision or their own
recognizance, despite ICE’s assessment that they represent
little risk. For RCA versions in effect up to February 2015,
between 50%-70% of Low/Low individuals were released. In
2015, this rate dropped to 30-40%. Recent entrants couldn’t
get low risk of flight after February 2015, so we surmise that
low public safety (not low risk of flight) is the driver of the
increase of detention in the low/low group. But under Trump,
less than 5% of people assessed as low risk on both factors
have been released.

21

An RD plot implements several data-driven Regression Discontinuity (RD)(plots), using evenlyspaced or quantile-spaced partitioning. The plot facilitates the accumulation of R-D based empirical
evidence. The vertical lines on the diagram represent variance; the smaller the population N, the
larger the variance. The red circle represents the mean.

et al.

The Growing Rate of Detention for Low-Risk Immigrants in
New York City under Trump and the Erasure of Individualized
Determinations. Graph 4 shows a dramatic shift in the number

of low-risk immigrants detained during the last year of the
Obama Administration compared with the beginning of the
Trump Administration. The y-axis is the percentage of total
individuals detained without bond who were assessed with
low public safety/low flight risk levels. The graph shows the
significant shift in the percentage of detained immigrants with
low levels of risk beginning with Trump’s inauguration. At
the end of the Obama Administration, approximately 15%
of individuals detained without bond by ICE in the New
York City area were assessed as low flight risk and low public
safety risk. Soon after Trump’s inauguration, the share of the
detained population representing a low risk to public safety
and a low risk of flight doubled to more than 30%.

We attribute the shift to a change from a tiered priority
enforcement policy to zero tolerance immigration policing,
keeping in mind that Obama detained many low-risk families
during 2015 and 2016 with his focus on recent entrants. With
Trump’s dragnet enforcement policy, large numbers of low-risk
immigrants were brought into the immigration enforcement
system and the simultaneous changes to the RCA meant that
they were not recommended for release. The lack of casebased determinations, in which ICE officers exercise their
discretion to detain or release according to risk, pops out with
alarming clarity in the RD Plot below. Once Trump’s zerotolerance policing is combined with the elimination of a release
recommendation, the share of total immigrants detained who
have the lowest risk combinations jumps from 15% to 30%.
iLCSS
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rithm, in a more punitive direction. Here, we show the shift
in officer dissent rates from Obama’s algorithm version 6.3 to
Trump’s version 6.4 in June 2017 that helped drive changes
to the algorithm and then reflect assent to those changes.

Fig. 4. Change in Share of Individuals Detained without Bond by ICE with Low/Low
Risk

The Growing Rate of Detention for Low-Risk Immigrants in
New York City under Trump and the Erasure of Individualized
Determinations. In the findings below, we empirically demon-

strate ICE’s blanket no-release policy under Trump as risk
level no longer correlates with detention rate and nearly everyone is detained. Table 2 below, shows a significant increase
in the rate of low public safety risk detainees who had been
arrested under zero tolerance and then detained without bond
under Trump. Table 1 shows a doubling of detention for lowrisk immigrants from Obama in 2016 (14.3%) to Trump in
2017 (28.6%). After 2013, the rate of low risk individuals
drops off dramatically until Trump takes office. Then the proportions start to flip. The rate of low-risk migrants detained
without bond then further increased in 2018 (32%), and again
in 2019 (34%). By 2019, the share of individuals detained
is approximately evenly distributed across public safety risk
levels, demonstrating the irrelevance of risk to ICE’s custody
decisions.
Note: The 2019 data includes information until mid-July
and is projected to reach rates similar to those of 2017 and
2018.
Figure 5 demonstrates that ICE officers trained the risk
algorithm with dissents (overriding the risk recommendation).
Overrides were seen as indicators of dysfunction in the algorithm, ICE corrected for dysfunction by modifying the algo-

Although Obama removed the bond recommendation from
version 6.3 in February 2015, immigrants with low flight and
low public safety risk assessments were still recommended for
release. Trump’s zero-tolerance policing trained the algorithm
to move yet further away from its original purpose. Immigrants
were arrested and brought into custody regardless of risk level
as an expression of zero-tolerance enforcement, starting in
February 2017. Expressions of discontent with the Obama
algorithm and its release recommendation were subsequently
registered in officer overrides of the RCA recommendation to
release these low risk individuals. The officer overrides led to
the detention of low-risk immigrants starting that month. The
no-release policy was then formalized in June 2017 through
further manipulation of the RCA’s recommendations.

Graph 5 shows an abrupt increase in supervisor overrides
of risk recommendations for individuals who are a low risk to
public safety. The override rate (share of officer disagreement),
climbs from about 15% in February 2017 to almost 40% in
May 2017. The supervisors’ override rate quickly dropped
in June 2017 with the advent of the new algorithm, which
stopped recommending release for any risk category.

The Growing Rate of Detention for Low-Risk Immigrants in
New York City under Trump and the Erasure of Individualized
Determinations. Chart 4 lists public safety risk and flight risk

level combinations and the associated rate of detention between
2013 and 2019.

Table 2. Total Immigrants Detained without Bond by the ICE New York City Field Office by Public Safety Risk Level
Public Safety
Risk Level
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2014

2015

2016

2017

2018

2019

Total

Low

#
%

3,530
38.13

1,490
21.18

363
9.57

425
14.3

1,693
28.57

2,083
31.68

929
33.62

10,513
27.43

Medium

#
%

4,123
44.53

3,228
45.88

1,233
32.5

943
31.72

1,833
30.94

2,191
33.32

860
31.13

14,411
37.6

High

#
%

1,606
17.35

2,317
32.94

2,198
57.93

1,605
53.99

2,399
40.49

2,301
35

974
35.25

13,400
34.97

%

9,259
100

7,035
100

3,794
100

2,973
100

5,925
100

6,575
100

2,763
100

38,324
100

Total

8

2013

et al.

Figure 6: Detention without Bond by Risk of Public Safety (RPS) and Risk of Flight
(ROF) Combination

The Growing Rate of Detention for Low-Risk Immigrants in
New York City under Trump and the Erasure of Individualized
Determinations. The graph shows a remarkable spike in no

bond detention for almost every low-risk individual. The rate
for the combination of low public safety risk and low flight
risk went from a 40% detention rate in 2013, to about 35%
in 2014, and then rounding out at 100% by 2018 and 2019.
This approach to near total detention without bond for lowrisk immigrants highlights ICE’s undoubted commitment to
a no-release policy under Trump. Among those immigrants
eligible for release by law, risk no longer drives detention. ICE
officers have abdicated their obligations to assess each case
and tailor the use of detention accordingly. Instead, everyone
is detained.

Conclusion
Although the risk algorithm is a reform that has been intended
to make detention decisions increasingly objective and transparent over time, it has had the opposite effect on immigration
detention. Since 2012, when the risk algorithm started as a
pilot program until 2019, the risk algorithm and subsequent
detention decisions have become increasingly punitive. ICE
has mistreated immigrants in custody in the New York City
region. By denying an individualized determination of custody status it has violated federal regulations, statutes and
constitutional norms and hence stymied the non-criminalizing
objectives of civil detention. ICE has misused the risk classification assessment tool, which was designed to ensure a more
objective and accurate reading of flight and public safety risk.
The categorical denial of bond for huge swaths of immigrants,
despite their eligibility for release by statute, is anathema
to the expectations citizens and immigrants have of the U.S.
justice system.
This Report shows that ICE violates the regulatory requirement to provide an individualized determination. Trump’s
enforcement policies had the consequence of bringing a surge of
low-risk immigrants into ICE custody. The risk system should
strongly discourage the detention of low-risk immigrants who
posed no danger to society and no risk of flight. Such individuals should be released on community supervision or on
their own recognizance. The data show the opposite result.
ICE detains immigrants regardless of risk. The results show
that ICE has failed to perform the individualized assessment
required and restrict its use of civil detention to only those
Fig. 5. Officer Dissent rates
et al.
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whose high levels of dangerousness and risk of flight justify
their incarceration.
The risk algorithm was supposed to train officers to accommodate their behavior to objective terms of the risk tool.
Instead officer bias has trained the algorithm rather than
have the algorithm train human behavior. As a result, ICE
tightened the screws against low-risk immigrants by subjecting them to blanket detention, which has come to define the
no-release Trump immigration policy in the New York City
area. By using officers’ rate of dissent to drive changes to the
risk algorithm, the tool moved detention decisions away from
rationality and instead reinforced the bias against immigrants.
The few immigrants who were deemed eligible for bond by
ICE supervisors were subjected to extraordinarily high bonds,
adding another punitive layer to Trump’s already expansive
and unjustified detention policy.
Recommendations:
• End the no-release immigration detention policy. Trump’s
no-release policy detains without bond immigrants who
should never have been detained in the first place. Almost no immigrants have been released since 2018. At a
minimum, ICE should release low risk immigrants from
immigration detention. This call for release is all the
more urgent in the face of Covid-19 and ICE’s inadequate
response.
• ICE should provide an individualized determination of
custody status to every immigrant in immigration custody. ICE has deprived immigrants of the right to an
individualized custody determination, leaving many immigrants needlessly detained until they assert their right
to a bond redetermination hearing before an immigration
judge. For the majority of immigrants without counsel
this right is even more likely to go unexercised.
• ICE should stop the over-detention of immigrants with
special vulnerabilities. One of the initial objectives of
the risk classification assessment tool was the humane
response it promised for immigrants with special vulnerabilities. This report has shown how this promise has gone
unmet.
• Individual risk for immigrants in custody rises and falls
over time. The risk tool should be responsive to these
changes in risk--increases and decreases. The tool should
document favorable and unfavorable changes in risk; individuals should be reassessed for risk, and detention or
release decisions should be updated accordingly.
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Table 3. RCA Recommendations and Final Decisions by Year
RCA recommendation

2013

2014

2015

2016

2017

2018

2019

Total

Detain in the Custody
%
Detain with Bond
%
Release on Community
%
Supervisor to Determine
%
Total
%

2,576
0.49932157
1,341
0.2599341
61
0.011824
1,181
0.22892033
5,159
1

2,082
0.53112245
580
0.14795918
292
0.0744898
966
0.24642857
3,920
1

1,439
0.74714434
26
0.01349948
80
0.04153686
381
0.19781931
1,926
1

1,100
0.72178478
0
0
83
0.05446194
341
0.22375328
1,524
1

2,365
0.7965645
0
0
148
0.04984843
456
0.15358707
2,969
1

2,848
0.86618005
0
0
0
0
440
0.13381995
3,288
1

1,473
0.88949275
0
0
5
0.00301932
178
0.10748792
1,656
1

13,883
0.67914098
1,947
0.09524508
669
0.03272674
3,943
0.19288719
20,442
1

RCA Final Decision

2013

2014

2015

2016

2017

2018

2019

Total

1. Detain, No Bond

3,087
0.59837178
1,112
0.21554565
960
0.18608257
5,159
1

2,336
0.59591837
559
0.14260204
1,025
0.26147959
3,920
1

1,765
0.91640706
45
0.02336449
116
0.06022845
1,926
1

1,447
0.94451697
1
0.00065274
84
0.05483029
1,532
1

2,917
0.9742819
4
0.00133601
73
0.0243821
2,994
1

3,243
0.98421851
1
0.00030349
51
0.015478
3,295
1

1,611
0.97695573
1
0.00060643
37
0.02243784
1,649
1

16,406
0.80126984
1,723
0.0841514
2,346
0.11457875
20,475
1

4,199
0.81391743

2,895
0.73852041

1,810
0.93977155

1,448
0.94516971

2,921
0.9756179

3,244
0.984522

1,612
0.97756216

18,129
0.88542125
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2. Detain with Bond
8. Community Supervision
Total

Detained, eligible and not eligible for bond

et al.
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Table 4. Percent Detained, no Bond by Risk Level by Year

Low RPS Low ROF
Low RPS Med ROF
Med RPS Low ROF
Med RPS Med ROF
Low RPS, High ROF
High RPS, Low ROF
Med RPS, High ROF
High RPS, Med ROF
High RPS, High ROF
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2013
66
0.43708609
254
0.41033926
86
0.43877551
369
0.48425197
855
0.69738989
33
0.38823529
895
0.68320611
149
0.4775641
353
0.75751073

2014
116
0.35045317
54
0.432
383
0.57078987
156
0.50649351
219
0.49772727
277
0.54743083
518
0.65239295
145
0.75129534
437
0.84038462

2015
94
0.75806452
17
0.70833333
469
0.90891473
55
0.93220339
34
0.87179487
879
0.93610224
27
0.9
96
0.96
50
1

2016
73
0.60833333
31
0.86111111
383
0.97704082
50
0.90909091
77
0.97468354
626
0.978125
17
1
96
0.97959184
59
1

2017
230
0.86466165
76
0.96202532
372
0.97637795
80
0.96385542
512
0.99610895
470
0.98739496
436
0.99316629
99
0.97058824
606
0.99181669

2018
158
0.96341463
132
0.97777778
221
0.97356828
89
0.98888889
724
0.9797023
178
0.9726776
764
0.99479167
87
0.98863636
867
0.98859749

2019
67
0.95714286
68
0.95774648
97
0.98979592
42
0.97674419
355
0.95174263
78
1
363
0.98373984
53
0.98148148
441
0.98878924
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